Summary
B&R is aware of a vulnerability in the product versions listed as affected in the advisory. An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability could make the OPC-UA server of the product inaccessible.
The following versions of B&R PPT30 Operating System are affected:
- PPT30 Operating System <1.8.0, 1.8.0 (CVE-2025-11482)
| CVSS | Vendor | Equipment | Vulnerabilities |
|---|---|---|---|
| v3 7.5 | B&R Industrial Automation GmbH | B&R PPT30 Operating System | Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling |
Background
- Critical Infrastructure Sectors: Commercial Facilities, Critical Manufacturing, Energy, Transportation Systems, Water and Wastewater
- Countries/Areas Deployed: Worldwide
- Company Headquarters Location: Switzerland
Vulnerabilities
CVE-2025-11482
An Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in the OPC-UA Server used in PPT30 Operating System versions before 1.8.0 may be used by an unauthenticated network-based at-tacker to permanently prevent legitimate users from interacting with the service.
Affected Products
B&R PPT30 Operating System
Vendor:
B&R Industrial Automation GmbH
Product Version:
B&R Industrial Automation GmbH PPT30 Operating System <1.8.0
Product Status:
fixed, known_affected
Relevant CWE: CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Metrics
Acknowledgments
- ABB PSIRT reported this vulnerability to CISA.
Notice
The information in this document is subject to change without notice, and should not be construed as a commitment by B&R. B&R provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall B&R or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if B&R or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. This document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from B&R, and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose. All rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners.
Frequently asked questions
What causes the vulnerability? – The vulnerability is caused by insufficient handling of resources by the OPC-UA Server used by the PPT30 Operating System. What is PPT 30 Operating System – The PPT30 Operating System is the firmware required to use the B&R PPT30 hardware products. What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do? – An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could cause other users are no longer able to connect to the OPC-UA server on impacted devices. How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability? – An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending messages to an affected system node. This would require that the attacker has access to the system network, by connecting to the network either directly or through a wrongly configured or penetrated firewall, or that he installs malicious software on a system node or otherwise infects the network with malicious software. Recommended practices help mitigate such attacks, see section Mitigating Factors above. Could the vulnerability be exploited remotely? – Yes, an attacker who has network access to an affected system node could exploit this vulnerability. Recommended practices include that process control systems are physically protected, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed. When this security advisory was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed? – No, B&R discovered the vulnerabilities through its own security analysis. When this security advisory was issued, had B&R received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited? – No, B&R had not received any information indicating that this vulnerability had been exploited when this security advisory was originally issued
Legal Notice and Terms of Use
This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).
Recommended Practices
CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of these vulnerabilities.
Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.
Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.
When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.
CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B–Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
Advisory Conversion Disclaimer
This ICSA is a verbatim republication of ABB PSIRT SA25P006 from a direct conversion of the vendor’s Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA’s website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided “as-is” for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact ABB PSIRT directly for any questions regarding this advisory.
Revision History
- Initial Release Date: 2026-05-26
| Date | Revision | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-26 | 1 | Initial version. |
| 2026-06-04 | 2 | Initial CISA Republication of ABB PSIRT SA25P006 advisory |